Mukhtasar al-Ma'ani by al-Taftazani, Vol. 2 (مختصر المعاني) — Page 192

Line-by-line translation · المعاني

اَلْكِنَايَةُ فَإِنَّهُ لَا يَجُوزُ فِيهِ إِرَادَةُ الْمَعْنَى الْحَقِيقِيِّ لِلُزُومِ الْقَرِينَةِ الْمَانِعَةِ عَنْ إِرَادَةِ الْمَعْنَى الْحَقِيقِيِّ، وَقَوْلُهُ: الشَّأْنُ مِنْ جِهَةِ إِرَادَةِ الْمَعْنَى مَعْنَاهُ مِنْ جِهَةِ جَوَازِ إِرَادَةِ الْمَعْنَى لِيُوَافِقَ مَا ذَكَرَهُ فِي تَعْرِيفِ الْكِنَايَةِ؛ أَيْ إِنَّمَا قَدَّرْنَا الْمُضَافَ وَلِأَنَّ الْكِنَايَةَ كَثِيرًا مَا تَخْلُو عَنْ إِرَادَةِ الْمَعْنَى الْحَقِيقِيِّ لِلْقَطْعِ بِصِحَّةِ قَوْلِنَا: فُلَانٌ طَوِيلُ النِّجَادِ وَجَبَانُ الْكَلْبِ وَمَهْزُولُ الْفَصِيلِ وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ نِجَادٌ وَلَا كَلْبٌ وَلَا فَصِيلٌ، وَمِثْلُ هَذَا فِي الْكَلَامِ أَكْثَرُ مِنْ أَنْ تُحْصَى وَهَهُنَا بَحْثٌ لَا بُدَّ مِنَ التَّنْبِيهِ عَلَيْهِ، وَهُوَ أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِجَوَازِ إِرَادَةِ الْمَعْنَى الْحَقِيقِيِّ فِي الْكِنَايَةِ هُوَ أَنَّ الْكِنَايَةَ مِنْ حَيْثُ إِنَّهَا كِنَايَةٌ لَا تُنَافِي ذَلِكَ كَمَا أَنَّ الْمَجَازَ لَا مِنْ حَيْثُ خُصُوصِ الْمَادَّةِ يُنَافِيهِ، لَكِنْ قَدْ يَمْتَنِعُ ذَلِكَ فِي الْكِنَايَةِ بِوَاسِطَةِ خُصُوصِ الْمَادَّةِ كَمَا ذَكَرَهُ صَاحِبُ الْكَشَّافِ فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى: لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ أَنَّهُ مِنْ بَابِ الْكِنَايَةِ كَمَا فِي قَوْلِهِمْ: مِثْلُكَ لَا يَبْخَلُ؛ لِأَنَّهُمْ إِذَا نَفَوْهُ عَمَّنْ يُمَاثِلُهُ وَعَمَّنْ يَكُونُ عَلَى أَخَصِّ أَوْصَافِهِ فَقَدْ نَفَوْهُ عَنْهُ، وَقَوْلُهُ مِنْ جِهَةِ هَذَا جَوَابٌ عَنْ اعْتِرَاضٍ وَارِدٍ عَلَى الْمُصَنِّفِ، وَحَاصِلُهُ: أَنَّ فِي كَلَامِهِ تَنَافِيًا بَيْنَ التَّفْرِيعِ وَالْمُفَرَّعِ عَلَيْهِ، وَذَلِكَ؛ لِأَنَّ الْمُفَرَّعَ عَلَيْهِ يَقْتَضِي أَنَّ إِرَادَةَ كُلٍّ مِنَ اللَّازِمِ وَالْمَلْزُومِ فِي الْكِنَايَةِ جَائِزَةٌ، وَالتَّفْرِيعُ يَقْتَضِي أَنَّ إِرَادَتَهُمَا مَعًا وَاقِعَةٌ وَحَاصِلُ مَا أَجَابَ بِهِ الشَّارِحُ أَنَّ فِي التَّفْرِيعِ حَذْفَ مُضَافٍ أَيْ مِنْ جِهَةِ جَوَازِ إِرَادَةِ الْمَعْنَى.

As for metonymy (kinayah), it is not permissible to intend the literal meaning within it due to the necessity of a contextual indicator that prevents the intention of the literal meaning. His statement, 'the matter is from the perspective of intending the meaning,' means 'from the perspective of the permissibility of intending the meaning,' so that it aligns with what he mentioned in the definition of metonymy; that is, we only supplied the genitive noun (mudaf) because metonymy is often devoid of the intention of the literal meaning, as evidenced by the certainty of the correctness of our saying: 'So-and-so is long of sword-belt (tall), cowardly of dog (hospitable), and lean of young camel (generous),' even if he has no sword-belt, no dog, and no young camel. Examples of this in speech are too numerous to count. Here, there is a point of inquiry that must be pointed out, which is that what is meant by the 'permissibility of intending the literal meaning' in metonymy is that metonymy, in its capacity as metonymy, does not contradict that, just as metaphor (majaz) does not contradict it in terms of the specific substance. However, this may be prevented in metonymy by virtue of the specific substance, as the author of Al-Kashshaf mentioned regarding the Almighty's saying: 'There is nothing like unto Him,' that it is from the category of metonymy, as in their saying: 'Someone like you does not act miserly,' because when they negate it from someone who resembles him and from someone who possesses his most specific attributes, they have negated it from him. His statement 'from the perspective of' is a response to an objection raised against the author, the gist of which is that there is a contradiction in his speech between the derivation (tafri') and that from which it is derived (mufarra' 'alayh). This is because that from which it is derived implies that the intention of both the implied meaning and the literal meaning in metonymy is permissible, while the derivation implies that the intention of both together is what occurs. The gist of what the commentator answered is that there is an omitted genitive noun in the derivation, meaning 'from the perspective of the permissibility of intending the meaning.'

طَوِيلُ النِّجَادِ كِنَايَةٌ عَنْ طُولِ الْقَامَةِ؛ لِأَنَّهُ يَلْزَمُ مِنْ طُولِ النِّجَادِ أَيْ حَمَائِلِ السَّيْفِ طُولُ الْقَامَةِ.

'Long of sword-belt' is a metonym for tall stature, because long sword-belts—that is, the straps of the sword—necessitate tall stature.

وَجَبَانُ الْكَلْبِ كِنَايَةٌ عَنِ الْكَرَمِ؛ لِأَنَّ جُبْنَ الْكَلْبِ أَيْ عَدَمَ جِرَاءَتِهِ عَلَى مَنْ يَمُرُّ بِهِ يَسْتَلْزِمُ كَثْرَةَ الْوَارِدِينَ عَلَيْهِ، وَكَثْرَةَ الْوَارِدِينَ تَسْتَلْزِمُ كَرَمَ صَاحِبِهِ وَمَهْزُولُ الْفَصِيلِ كِنَايَةٌ عَنِ الْكَرَمِ أَيْضًا؛ لِأَنَّ هُزَالَ الْفَصِيلِ يَسْتَلْزِمُ عَدَمَ وُجُودِ اللَّبَنِ فِي أُمِّهِ، وَهُوَ يَسْتَلْزِمُ الِاعْتِنَاءَ بِالضَّيْفَانِ لِأَخْذِ اللَّبَنِ مِنْ أُمِّهِ وَسَقْيِهِ لَهُمْ، وَكَثْرَةَ الضَّيْفَانِ تَسْتَلْزِمُ الْكَرَمَ وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ نِجَادٌ: فَإِذَا صَحَّتِ الْكِنَايَةُ بِنَحْوِ هَذِهِ الْأَلْفَاظِ وَوَقَعَتْ بِهَا مَعَ انْتِفَاءِ أَصْلِ مَعْنَاهُ لَمْ يَصْدُقْ أَنَّهُ أُرِيدَ بِهَا الْمَعْنَى الْحَقِيقِيُّ، فَلَوْ لَمْ يُرَدَّ الْكَلَامُ إِلَى الْجَوَازِ خَرَجَتْ هَذِهِ الْأَلْفَاظُ عِنْدَ انْتِفَاءِ مَعَانِيهَا عَنِ التَّعْرِيفِ.

'Cowardly of dog' is a metonym for generosity, because the cowardice of the dog—that is, its lack of boldness toward those who pass by it—necessitates a large number of visitors to him, and a large number of visitors necessitates the generosity of its owner. 'Lean of young camel' is also a metonym for generosity, because the leanness of the young camel necessitates the absence of milk in its mother, and that necessitates attending to guests by taking the milk from its mother and giving it to them to drink, and a large number of guests necessitates generosity, even if he has no sword-belt. So, if metonymy is valid with such expressions and occurs through them despite the absence of their original meaning, it would not be true that the literal meaning was intended by them. Therefore, if the speech were not referred back to 'permissibility,' these expressions would fall outside the definition when their meanings are absent.

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Vocabulary · المفردات (30 verbs · 67 nouns)

• جَازَ — to be permissible
• ذَكَرَ — to mention
• وَافَقَ — to agree
• كِنَايَة — metonymy
• مَعْنًى — meaning
• حَقِيقِيّ — real